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Even to one who has read her book several times, Cott's analy-
sis is sometimes batHing, Cott being most muddled when she needs 
to be most precise. Never much of a stylist, she compounds her 
difficulties by mentioning recent events without having prepared the 
reader in any way for what she seems to regard as truisms. But 
does everyone agree that feminism unites women's liberation and 
women's rights, and do we all know what the differences are? For 
that matter, does the women's liberation movement still exist? And 
what does it mean to say that feminisms are growing toward the 
plural? 
When an accomplished scholar, whose footnotes demonstrate 
wide reading and research, and who has many fresh things to say 
about familiar subjects, writes as badly as this, one looks for the 
reason. My impression is that Cott was never able to determine the 
purpose of her study. She disagrees with other historians, including 
me, on many points, often convincingly. What she has been unable 
to do is to pull together her own material in such a way as to offer 
an alternative reading. Cott does not attempt to disguise the failure 
by cobbling together some rickety thesis after the fact, as often hap-
pens. Hers is an honest book, but even so the whole is less than the 
sum of its parts. 
The Grounding of Modern Feminism is still worth reading. 
Cott's research is superb, and, unlike many who have written on 
these subjects, her book is not didactic, quarrelsome, or ideological. 
Further, she has a gift for finding new ways of looking at well 
known problems. Next time I hope that she will add a fully devel-
oped thesis. 
GENDER SANITY: THE CASE AGAINST FEMINISM. 
Edited by Nicholas Davidson.1 Lanham, Maryland: Univer-
sity Press of America. 1989. Pp. 260. $19.95. 
Dianne S. Farber2 
Gender Sanity is an argument against radical feminism, a belief 
system which says that all men exploit women; that the scientific 
method is an instrument of subordination; that the beliefs and ideas 
of Western civilization are oppressive to women; that women are 
not just equal to but exactly the same as or better than men; that 
I. Author, editor, and contributor to periodicals. 
2. Contributor to periodicals. 
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children and child care are vital only to the weak; and that the wor-
thy goals of radical feminism justify repression of speech. 
The book's title and many of its essays misleadingly equate 
feminism with radical feminism. As a feminist, I believe that wo-
men should receive equal pay for equal work; that women have 
wrongly been denied access to certain jobs in the past because of 
their sex; that women should be accorded the same worth and dig-
nity as men; that bearing and rearing children should be as respect-
able a job as any other; that women had some good reasons for 
starting their revolution against the world that was. As a feminist, I 
also find much merit in this book. 
The most worrisome aspect of radical feminism is its intoler-
ance of debate. Davidson raises this concern in the book's preface: 
"Perhaps feminists are right to silence views with which they don't 
agree; criticism of feminism is so dangerous and extreme that it jus-
tifies the repression of diversity." "Or perhaps-on the other 
hand-feminism itself is an intolerant ideology that threatens 
freedom." 
Clearly, Davidson believes the latter, and the reader comes 
away agreeing with him. Davidson describes a pervasive effort 
within both the mass media and the academic community to deny 
radical feminism's critics the opportunity to be heard. He asserts 
the existence of a " 'Lace Curtain' of networked feminists" that by 
"hatred and obscurantism" has affected every contributor to the 
book. Three examples: (1) Steven Goldberg's book, The Inevitabil-
ity of Patriarchy, on which one chapter of Gender Sanity is based, 
actually held the 1988 Guinness Book of World Records top position 
"for the most editors' rejections of any book ever published"; 
(2) "The Myth of the Role Revolution," by George Gilder, was ini-
tially accepted by Penthouse, the Atlantic, and Success magazine 
and later rejected by each in tum "when editors discovered that the 
piece would anger feminists"; (3) "The Truth About Domestic Vio-
lence," by R.L. McNeely and Gloria Robinson-Simpson, when ini-
tially published in the respected journal Social Work, "unleashed a 
deluge of hate mail from feminists, including threats to stop the 
authors' funding for future research." 
In short, Davidson asserts that feminism is now "the gender 
ideology of our society," and that public debate about the social 
effects of twenty years of feminism has been stymied by the move-
ment's success in preventing criticism of its ideology. 
Because radical feminism has such a grip on today's intellectu-
als, books like Gender Sanity are seldom published, let alone widely 
reviewed or heavily touted by their publishers. With the knowledge 
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that few who read this review will ever see the book, I have taken 
the liberty of quoting more extensively than is usual in a book re-
view to help open up this stifled public debate. 
I 
Consistency and organization are problems in any collection of 
essays, and Gender Sanity is no exception. The book's organization 
seems arbitrary and its tone highly variable, ranging from Midge 
Deeter's sardonic classic, "The Liberated Woman," written in fairy 
tale style, and Jack Kammer's lighthanded effort in "The Noble 
Savage," to the highly scholarly tone of Davidson's "The Rise and 
Fall of Cultural Determinism," and Carol Iannone's "Feminist 
Scholarship: A Case History." 
One section, entitled "Children," illustrates some of the book's 
shortcomings. First, the section contains only two articles, one be-
ing "Day Care and Children," by William and Wendy Dreskin, the 
other Michael Levin's article on "The Impact of Feminism on Pri-
ma!"y Education." The Dreskins make some important points 
about the repression of public discourse on the effects of day care. 
Levin makes powerful criticisms of the totalitarian (or, if the subject 
were not so serious, Alice in Wonderland) nature of attempts to 
stamp out gender bias in public education. But Davidson should 
have asked the authors to update their source materials. In an area 
as volatile as radical feminism, fifteen-year-old data is ancient 
history. 
The Dreskin article is a reprint of "The Day Care Debate," 
from their 1983 book, The Day Care Decision: What's Best for You 
and Your Child. The Dreskins make the point that the number of 
American children in day care is grossly exaggerated in the mass 
media, that "half of all children whose mothers work full time are 
cared for by a family member or relative, and when a mother works 
part time only one child in three is cared for by someone other than 
a parent or relative." Nevertheless, "the number of children en-
rolled in day care centers has more than quadrupled" in the past 
fifteen years, with these centers being used by "fifteen percent of all 
children whose mothers work full time." 
Some important work on the effects of day care is being done 
by Jay Belsky, a researcher at Penn State University. If the 
Dreskins had quoted data more recent than 1978 (and the 1987 
copyright on some of the articles in Gender Sanity makes this seem 
possible, even given publication lag), they could have offered details 
about Belsky's work that graphically illustrate their observation 
that: 
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[W]hile many researchers do try to remain objective and unbiased when working in 
an unpopular area, the absence of hard scientific proof in the day care debate has 
led many experts to hide their suspicions or reservations about day care and adopt 
an officially neutral or even pro-day care position, thereby avoiding the unpleasant-
ness of intense criticism and political pressure. We believe that many of these same 
professors who are taking a neutral position on the day care issue would openly 
express their reservations and concerns in a climate where such an attitude was 
welcome, or at least acceptable. 
Recent events have revealed how far we are from providing a 
tolerant climate for discussing the effects of day care. In 1986, Bel-
sky publicized his findings after analyzing five studies of children 
who were tested in the "strange situation," a test designed to mea-
sure the quality of an infant's attachment to the usual caregiver.3 
Many researchers believe the quality of this attachment shows a 
child's sense of trust and security and predicts future social adjust-
ment. 4 Belsky found 
evidence of less secure attachments when extensive nonmaternal day care had been 
initiated in the first year of life. He has cited "a disquieting trend in the evidence on 
older children," finding more aggressive and noncompliant behavior among 5-year-
olds who as infants had extensive center-based care. In other studies of older 
preschoolers he cites, children were described as more anxious and hyperactive than 
their peers who had not been in care as infants. 5 
Belsky's findings led to an avalanche of criticism of him both as 
a researcher and as a family man. Press reports at the time de-
scribed child care experts as "outraged not only that Belsky would 
publish such a report but also that he would tout it on talk shows 
even before it was published. "6 (Imagine that!) Some experts "ac-
cused Belsky of harboring a personal bias (his wife quit a profes-
sional position to raise their children) and of being publicity-
hungry. "7 One reporter, in a confession-style article, wrote of her 
own child care arrangements and described how she had contacted 
Belsky and asked him if he had ever considered "staying home so 
that his wife might be the one to work for pay?"s When Belsky 
replied that "the dual conceptualization [of him and his wife] was 
always that I would be working,"9 the reporter wrote that: 
... I wanted very badly ... to haul Jay Belsky out of his office at Penn State 
University and prop him up in a rocking chair at 2 a.m. with a wrench in his viscera 
because he loves so deeply the baby he is holding and he needs so wildly to reclaim 
3. N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1987, at 9, § B, col. I. 
4. /d. 
5. /d. 
6. THE ATLANTIC, Aug. 1988, at 73. 
7. /d. 
8. L.A. Times, August 30, 1987, at 8, Part 6, col. I. 
9. !d. 
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his work-his other work, his paying work.! O 
Belsky, with his feet to the fire, carefully and publicly defined 
his enemies and lashed out against the " 'inflammatory' distortion 
of his and others' research by conservative 'political partisans.' "II 
"They [conservative partisans] have translated our message to mean that infant day 
care is bad and that those who put infants in it are bad," said Dr. Belsky. "I have 
never said that only mothers should care for their babies or that they should quit 
their jobs to be home with them."12 
Curiously, Belsky did not claim he was disturbed by the attacks on 
himself, his wife, and his work made by the presumably liberal 
press, by radical feminists and others on the left. 
Finally, so loud was the clamor and so painful the handwring-
ing, that Dr. Edward Zigler, director of the Bush Center in Child 
Development and Social Policy at Yale University, set up an "ex-
traordinary meeting"t3 in Washington, D.C. on October 23, 1987, 
that he dubbed "an 'infant day care summit meeting.' "t4 The 
meeting was held under the auspices of the National Center for 
Clinical Infant Programs, a private non-profit child care organiza-
tion, and was attended by Zigler, Belsky, and fourteen other promi-
nent colleagues. At the meeting, Belsky's brief departure from 
officially approved doctrine was quashed, neatly and some might 
say elegantly, with the further bonus of reminding everyone that the 
real danger was not intolerant radical feminist ideology but evil 
conservatives.I5 And thus the "Lace Curtain" rang down on the 
day care debate. 
The Belsky flap illustrates well a point made again and again in 
the Davidson book: because of the "Lace Curtain" "no aspect of 
modern life has been so inadequately debated as feminism." David-
son's own contribution to the book, "The Rise and Fall of Cultural 
Determinism," offers a history of the development of the "Lace 
Curtain" beginning with the work of anthropologist Franz Boas 
and, more importantly, Margaret Mead. 
Davidson describes how cultural determinism, upon which 
10. /d. 
II. See N.Y. Times, supra note 3, at 9, col. I. 
12. /d. 
13. /d. 
14. /d. 
15. /d. The participants drafted a statement "supporting day care for infants and tod-
dlers but declaring an urgent need for more available care and for better salaries, working 
conditions and training for workers. . . . [T]he statement asserts that for both infants and 
toddlers, 'there is every reason to believe that both children and families can thrive' when 
parents 'have access to stable child-care arrangements featuring skilled, sensitive and moti-
vated care-givers.' " 
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radical feminism is based, I6 developed as the "latest incarnation of 
the tabula rasa propounded by John Locke in the late seventeenth 
century: that the human child is a blank slate upon which society 
writes to create a personality." Calling this a "severely reduction-
ist" idea, Davidson suggests that to believe in cultural determinism, 
one must believe that "evolution, which determines most animal be-
havior, at some point ceased to affect human beings. The idea used 
to explain this discontinuity is the modern anthropological concept 
of 'culture.' " Davidson then criticizes Franz Boas, the father of 
modern American anthropology, whose ideas "sound like surpris-
ingly up-to-date-expressions of the American left." 
Boas's most famous student was Margaret Mead, and David-
son notes that she "was the great popularizer of cultural determin-
ism-particularly as it applied to the sexes." Mead wrote that 
"[M]any, if not all, of the personality traits which we have called 
masculine or feminine . . . are as lightly linked to sex as are the 
clothing, the manners, and the form of headdress that a society at a 
given period assigns to either sex .... " Mead backed up her decla-
rations with field research that she said proved her theories. 
Her research has since been found deeply flawed, inaccurate 
not only in its conclusions but in its descriptions of the three socie-
ties she used to bolster her theories,I7 Davidson notes that "no pro-
fessional critique of her Samoan work appeared in her lifetime; and 
since there was no professional critique, there was no critique at 
all." He offers an anecdote that explains the lack of criticism of 
Mead's work as well as the curious persistence of certain ideas in 
academia. The anecdote concerns one Lowell Holmes, a graduate 
student in anthropology in the 1950s who returned from a field trip 
to Samoa determined to make his name by revealing how wrong 
Mead was. His academic advisor, a famous anthropologist, "lis-
tened in silence" as Holmes excitedly explained his findings. 
"When Holmes finished, the professor looked him in the eye and 
said deliberately, 'Don't attack Margaret.'" Holmes, defeated, 
"produced a standard ethnography in which he took care not to 
make waves." Davidson backs up the anecdote by citing a letter 
from Holmes to Derek Freeman, an Australian who finally attacked 
Margaret in 1983. Though she was dead and buried, Freeman was 
reproached for his criticism, "less on scientific than on political 
grounds." Davidson notes that Freeman's work was seen as "an 
16. See, e.g., B. BENDERLY, THE MYTH OF Two MINDS: WHAT GENDER MEANS 
AND DOESN'T MEAN (1987). 
17. Steven Goldberg also takes on Mead in his oft-rejected contribution to the book, 
"The Universality of Patriarchy." 
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assault on the social liberal world view." And it was, "for Mead's 
work had indeed provided fifties and sixties liberals with their most 
essential assumptions about man and society." 
Davidson makes the important point that Mead's ideas, based 
upon romantic notions more than careful field work, have held 
sway for more than fifty years, "an eternity in the progress of mod-
ern science." He suggests rightly that American social science is in 
desperate need of new ideas. 
The sanctification of Margaret Mead began the weaving of the 
Lace Curtain. As Davidson writes, "The university is the last sur-
viving medieval institution in America, in which a guild mentality 
among the tenured elect prevails, along with near-absolute author-
ity over the candidates for initiation." He further notes, of the 
Holmes episode, that "[C]ultural determinism was such a funda-
mental assumption of [the social liberal] consensus that to question 
it was to guarantee exclusion or expulsion from the cushy club of 
intellectual inquiry." 
Holmes's lesson occurred in the 1950s, but Rosalind Rosen-
berg learned hers just three years ago. Rosenberg, a feminist histo-
rian at Barnard College, dared to do what Lowell Holmes lacked 
the foolhardiness (or perhaps courage) to do: She publicly spoke 
the truth as she understood it, and has since suffered professional 
ostracism as well as other forms of harassment.ts 
Carol Iannone, in her chapter on feminist scholarship, offers an 
overview of the facts, which involved Rosenberg's testimony in the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's sex discrimination 
suit against Sears, Roebuck, decided in 1986. The EEOC brought 
suit against Sears, long known as a model affirmative action em-
ployer, for allegedly discriminating against women in its promo-
tions of employees to commissioned sales jobs. Iannone notes that 
the EEOC failed over a period of eleven years to find any witnesses 
who could testify that they had been personally discriminated 
against. However, there were few women in commission sales, and 
the EEOC argued that "women act like men to maximize their in-
comes and would take good jobs if these were genuinely available." 
Therefore, the paucity of women in commission sales jobs must re-
flect subtle and systematic discrimination. 
Sears chose to fight back, for "the first time in the history of 
this kind of suit." Attorneys for Sears contended that "factors 
other than discrimination must be held accountable for the discrep-
ancy." They sought an expert in women's history to back up their 
18. See, e.g., Haskell & Levinson, Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing: Histori· 
ans and the Sears Case, 66 TEXAS L. REv. 1629 (1988). 
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assertion, and-after several historians refused to testify-they 
found Rosenberg. She argued that 
women and men have had different interests, goals and aspirations regarding work. 
For women, responsibilities in the home become a factor in choosing jobs, often 
prompting women to choose less well-paying jobs that complement their family 
lives over better-paying jobs that conflict. . . . Rosenberg asserted that women tend 
to be less interested than men in the kinds of equipment sold in commission sales, 
such as aluminum siding, furnaces and tires; and that they tend not to like the 
competitiveness of commission work, the longer hours, and the irregularity and 
uncertainty of income. 
Rosenberg's analysis was shored up by at least one witness that 
the EEOC had originally planned to call. This witness, Mary Nelle 
Parks, 19 said in a deposition with a Sears lawyer that she had tried 
commission sales "at the urging of Sears administrators" but "did 
not like it."2o She further stated that 
I cannot work well under pressure, and I was living on my own and had to be sure 
that I could pay for my debts, the house note, the rent. On a 6 percent [commis-
sion] or any basis of that type you were not guaranteed anything particular, and I 
needed to know what I could count on ... I knew I would wake up every morning 
going to work knowing I have got to make this much today in order to meet my 
bills, and I didn't want to work that way.21 
Rosenberg's testimony was challenged by Alice Kessler-Harris, 
also a women's historian, of Hofstra University. Kessler-Harris 
"insisted that the record shows that women have always been avail-
able for good jobs as these open up to them . . . . " Going even 
further, Kessler-Harris declared that "[F]ailure to find women in 
so-called non-traditional jobs can thus only be interpreted as a con-
sequence of employers' unexamined attitudes or preferences, which 
phenonemon is the essence of discrimination. "22 In response, Ro-
senberg then provided thirty-two pages of documentation to show 
that Kessler-Harris had committed "intellectual perjury," since her 
testimony conflicted with her own published work. 
Ultimately, the court found in favor of Sears on all claims, not-
ing the "well-informed" nature of Rosenberg's testimony and the 
"sweeping generalizations" of Kessler-Harris's. The decision was 
affirmed (2-1) on appeal, and the EEOC declined to appeal 
further.23 
Rosenberg has been villified by her colleagues ever since. 
19. /d. at 1642 n.70. 
20. /d. 
21. !d. 
22. /d. at 1635. 
23. /d. at 1636 (noting that Rosenberg and Kessler-Harris actually played a very pe-
ripheral role in the trial, with statisticians playing the main part). 
1990] BOOK REVIEW 149 
When she and Kessler-Harris spoke at a Columbia University wo-
men's seminar, Rosenberg was jeered. She was called "traitor" and 
her testimony termed an "immoral act" in a letter circulated 
through the academic historian community. She has been called 
immoral and unprofessional in articles in The Nation, Radical His-
tory Review, The Chronicle of Higher Education, and Ms. 24 She has 
even been accused of "red-baiting."2s Most disturbingly, the com-
plaint has not been with her views but with the fact that she testified 
for the wrong side. As a result of Rosenberg's audacity in telling 
the truth as she saw it, the Coordinating Committee of Women in 
the Historical Profession and the Conference Group in Women's 
History, at the 100th annual meeting of the American Historical 
Association, held in 1986, passed a resolution declaring, "We be-
lieve as feminist scholars we have a responsibility not to allow our 
scholarship to be used against the interests of women struggling for 
equity in our society." 
Even though Kessler-Harris ultimately admitted that "the 
pressure of the adversary system caused her to exaggerate,"26 the 
harassment of Rosenberg has not ended. In fact, the editors of 
Signs, an important feminist studies journal, chose not to include 
Rosenberg's rebuttal of Kessler-Harris, entitled "Written Rebuttal 
Testimony of Dr. Rosalind Rosenberg" in their so-called " 'archive' 
of materials pertaining to the Sears case .... "27 
Carol Iannone, in summarizing her thoughts about the Rosen-
berg case, makes three points. First she notes that "feminist schol-
arship is for the most part politically motivated," although most 
feminists do not believe this interferes with good scholarship. 
But we see now that when the real world actually enters into the picture, there is no 
space for male and female standards; it becomes either the standards as we know 
them through intellectual and academic history, or the shabby expedients of polit-
ical advocacy. 
Second, and I believe most important, Iannone notes that "the in-
terests of feminism are not necessarily identical with women's inter-
ests in general." Third, as I will explain later, she argues that 
radical feminists hold conflicting and contradictory views on the na-
ture of women. 
The Sears case provides glaring examples of the discrepancy 
between radical feminists' interests and those of other women, espe-
cially part-time workers. The EEOC decision to go after Sears was 
24. ld. at 1630-31. 
25. /d. at 1631. 
26. /d. at 1635. 
27. /d. at 1636. 
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inextricably tied to a high level EEOC attorney's membership in 
and devotion to the National Organization for Women.zs The at-
torney, David A. Copus, was on the NOW Compliance and En-
forcement Task Force, and "was a major architect of NOW's 
strategy at the same time that he was, as head of the EEOC's Na-
tional Programs Division, put in charge of the Sears investiga-
tion. "29 (In fact, Copus's glaring conflict of interest was later 
condemned at length by the Seventh Circuit as it reviewed the 
case.)3o After the EEOC decided to sue Sears (because of its size, 
not its egregious wrong-doing),31 part of Copus's strategy was to 
charge that Sears' disproportionate hiring of women as part-time 
workers was evidence of discrimination.32 
Thus, a NOW -influenced lawsuit against the country's largest 
employer of women, led that employer to spend twenty million dol-
lars to defend itself. Although Sears was ultimately vindicated in 
court, the case undoubtedly was watched anxiously by many com-
panies that employ women. These companies may well have in-
ferred from Sears' tribulations that having large numbers of part-
time employees makes an employer vulnerable to a discrimination 
complaint. Accordingly, some companies may now discourage 
part-time work.33 As anyone in the real world should understand, 
ordinary women with children have a great need for readily avail-
able part-time work. These women suffer when they have to work 
full-time or not at all. 
Iannone's final point is that radical feminism is caught up in 
numerous contradictions. Radical feminists cannot decide whether 
women are exactly the same as, or different from men. Thus they 
try, as Iannone points out, to maintain "a certain strategic flexibil-
ity." Moreover, radical feminists cannot decide whether to portray 
women "as victims or as active agents of their history." This confu-
sion has led radical feminist scholars such as Kessler-Harris (quoted 
here by Rosenberg) to criticize ordinary women's responses to the 
work world, in statements like the following: 
28. /d. at 1638 n.53. 
29. /d. 
30. /d. 
31. /d. 
32. /d. at 1640 n.61. 
33. /d. The Sears strategy was in fact so controversial within the EEOC that its Office 
of General Counsel leaked memos to the press. One such memo recommended dropping the 
part-time work discrimination charge, due to "the undeniable fact that a far greater propor-
tion of the female work force than the male work force is interested in part-time work." By 
the time of the trial, this charge had been dropped from the case; arguably, the point is still 
valid, that other employers closely watching the case might use the Sears example to avoid 
hiring part-time workers lest they be sued also. 
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[e]ven after women were "sucked into the competitive maelstrom, ... they contin-
ued to rationalize their activities in terms of familiar humane and nurturing values." 
These values, which were suited to family succor, tended to foster "inappropriate 
behavior patterns for participation in a competitive world."34 
151 
Or the following, also from Kessler-Harris: "Still caught in the be-
lief that the home came first, about one-third of the married women 
who earned wages [circa 1970) took part-time jobs .... "35 
It is not surprising that radical feminist strategists give part-
time work short shrift: As Kessler-Harris writes, to them it is a sign 
of the weakness of ordinary women who are still caught up in incor-
rect behavior, that is, behavior different from the radical feminists', 
and not politically correct according to their repressive world 
view.36 
II 
I would add another criticism of radical feminism to those of 
Carol Iannone, a criticism touched upon in both Rita Kramer's 
piece, "The Establishment of Feminism," and in Midge Deeter's 
rapier-penned offering, "The Liberated Woman." The charge is 
that radical feminism is blind to its class contradictions. 
As Kramer notes, Betty Friedan, in The Feminine Mystique, 
claimed to hear women's voices saying they wanted more than 
home, husband, and children. But, as Kramer observes, 
she was doing her listening primarily among college-educated upper middle class 
suburban housewives like herself, and her view of the American woman's lot was at 
best a limited one, hardly applying to the millions of working class white women 
and millions more black women who would have far preferred staying home to 
factory, clerical, or domestic work, and for whom jobs were not the route to self-
fulfillment, the answer to an identity crisis, but an often bleak and boring economic 
necessity. 
Betty Friedan was not talking about the women who worked at 
Sears. Aileen Fernandez, a black lawyer who succeeded Friedan as 
president of NOW in 1975, observed that "some black sisters are 
34. !d. at 1650. 
35. !d. at 1654. 
36. Cheri Loveless, in her contribution entitled The Invisible Majority: America's 
Homemakers, points out that fully ninety-one percent of women in a 1986 Newsweek poll 
done by the Gallup Organization ''indicated a preference to be at home at least part of the 
working day." Loveless notes, however, that in reporting the finding, Newsweek said only 
that "71 percent of the at-home mothers surveyed said they would like to work, and 75 
percent of working mothers said they would work even if they didn't need the money." The 
former figure was arrived at by lumping together women who said they would like to work 
full-time, part-time or at home. Only nine percent wanted to work full-time regular hours. 
The latter figure of seventy-five percent was undercut by an accompanying chart showing that 
only thirteen percent of those interviewed who worked full-time wanted to work full-time 
regular hours. 
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not sure that the feminist movement will meet their current needs" 
which another black woman defined for Betty Friedan as "for black 
men to get ahead." We see, looking back, how prophetic those 
questioning black voices were, and how scarcely those needs have 
been met by radical feminism. 
Indeed, the worth of all women's lives in past generations 
seems to have been washed away in the angry rhetoric of radical 
feminism. Now and then one reads a brief homage to Rosie the 
Riveter, but both academia and the popular media seem to accept 
Friedan's descriptions of women's lives, pre-1963, as totally valid. 
In twenty-five years, no one has gotten much of an audience contra-
dicting her description of empty suburban lives, women "living with 
their feet bound in the old image of glorified femininity, confining 
them to family life and to the home, 'a comfortable concentration 
camp.'" 
This image of women insults and demeans the great majority of 
women who were not living comfortable suburban lives, pretending 
to be helpless as good manners dictated in that stifling milieu. In-
deed, George Gilder in his chapter "The Myth of the Role Revolu-
tion," by placing women's lives in the historical context of the 
industrial revolution, reminds us that most women have always 
worked hard-at agriculture. He goes so far as to say that the sex-
ual revolution is more a story of both women and men leaving the 
farm than a tale of gender transformation. "As recently as eighty 
years ago," he writes, "most American families were engaged in ag-
riculture; this proportion has dropped to 3 percent. That is truly a 
revolution .... " Furthermore, Gilder notes, on farms "women did 
not restrict themselves to the kitchen and boudoir. Women in agri-
culture worked very hard beyond the hearth and cribside, com-
monly performing an array of jobs requiring far more onerous 
physical labor and longer hours than their current work." 
Gilder's observations fit the world I knew in the 1950s far bet-
ter than Friedan's. Surely my experience was not that unusual. I 
knew farm women who were proud of their physical strength. They 
needed it. I knew teachers whose children carried latchkeys. I 
heard stories of poor women in Europe three generations before me 
who worked in coal mines. Most of these women viewed them-
selves as partners with their men in a harsh world. 
It is the element of partnership that is missing in Friedan's oft-
repeated stories of women trapped in the kitchen. It is the grate-
fully acknowledged contribution of women to the family's work 
that has been forgotten in the bitter tales of woman's "chains that 
bind her in her trap." It is the truth that is missing when all women 
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are allowed to look at the world only through the childish eyes of 
Midge Deeter's "Liberated Woman." 
Deeter's chapter is taken from her 1971 book, but it still rings 
true. She describes the rising consciousness of a young woman who 
"was born into a very real world, and not a princess, [although] it 
may be only a little fanciful to imagine that her birth was attended 
by a visitation of good fairies." This young woman was born at the 
close of World War II, spent her growing up years in "a community 
of the economically secure." She was denied only those things that 
it was deemed in her best welfare to deny. The young woman was 
given the best of educations, ample sexual freedom, financial sup-
port by her parents when she decided after college to become a 
writer, in short, everything she could ever desire. Then she discov-
ered "Women's Liberation." 
The heroine has her consciousness raised, learns that she is ex-
pected to be one of society's "breeders," and gives in to her feelings 
of "sweet bitterness." This young woman wants to hear about her 
own personal oppression, she wants to keep "those good ugly feel-
ings." Gradually, in her formerly comfortable relationship with her 
lover, a rift grows, as "between them now, from breakfast to bed, 
would be the consciousness of a necessary, inevitable enmity and of 
the need to protect themselves most of all in the very place meant to 
be a haven from enemies-at home." 
Deeter ends her tale by talking about the young woman's idea 
of freedom: 
... the freedom she truly seeks is ... a freedom demanded by children and enjoyed 
by no one: the freedom from all difficulty. If in the end her society is at fault for 
anything, it is for allowing her to grow up with the impression that this is something 
possible to ask. Even the good fairies who attended her birth would never have 
dared so far. 
If our heroine is to have all she wants, with no cares, she must 
have the services of others-nannies, housekeepers, errand-run-
ners-lesser beings among the elect, who make her world run 
smoothly. Radical feminism put in this context is in reality freedom 
only for the select few-the ones the magazines write for and the 
manufacturers make consumer goods for. While they are having it 
all, they also demand that society collectively free them from any 
troubling guilt for their actions or inactions, especially as regards 
their behavior toward their children.37 
37. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, March 22, 1989, at 6, § B, col. I. The article discusses 
problems beginning to appear among some pre-school and elementary school age children of 
those two-career couples who employ nannies, au pairs, and housekeepers. Priscilla Vail, a 
private school administrator, said " 'we had begun to see bright children from highly edu-
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Taken together, the essays in this collection make a convincing 
case that radical feminism is an intolerant ideology. In the preface 
the editor asks, "Is there a viable alternative?" He does not offer 
one. While several articles hint at alternatives, none really offers a 
cohesive prescription for a less destructive ideology, one that 
promises fair treatment to all without scapegoating one sex or the 
other.3s 
How is the reader of Gender Sanity to begin rethinking the 
dominant sexual ideology of our time? One begins with the premise 
that radical feminism "has begun to lose the ideological wars," and 
that "it has begun to lose the moral ground as well," as Carol Ian-
none observes. One admits there are no winners in this war be-
tween women and men, and children are chief among the losers. In 
a world where the women hate the men, a woman with a boy child 
is compromised. How can she raise a son if she despises what he 
will become? How can she reconcile the moral effect of such hatred 
upon her daughters? 
Significantly, Davidson included few articles about children, 
presumably because radical feminists don't talk about them. Chil-
dren are an embarrassment to the Cause. Children go with the 
kinds ofwomen who work part-time at Sears. If there were no chil-
dren, women could just go on arguing with men about who is bet-
ter, stronger, purer, smarter. 
Radical feminists don't know what to do about children, the 
power of children to entrap women in webs of love and need. They 
have tried to stamp out other women's need for children and they 
have labored mightily over their own denial. Children are a burden 
and make women weak. This is now a cultural adage. 
Yet if we were quite sane, if we even approached the dilemma 
as good economists,39 we would try to balance a woman's economic 
cated parents coming to class lacking in some very basic skills.' " Ms. Vail noted "a decline 
in vocabulary skills," and observed that "private-school pupils no longer understood their 
world the way 'kids brought up in these types of homes traditionally did from very early 
on.'" Ms. Vail "was referring to the fact that some parents today, while still strongly con-
cerned about their children's education, seemed less willing to put in the time to provide their 
children with certain basic skills." 
38. Davidson does include two articles by Cheri Loveless, a founder of the support 
organization Mothers at Home. One, Heirs to a Movement: Today's Guilty Mothers, spells 
out the conflicts a woman today faces when she tries to reconcile home and work. Loveless 
offers the sensible suggestion that women should be free to decide their lives for themselves, 
but she offers no way out of the impasse. 
39. See e.g., V. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 68 (1988). Econo-
mist Fuchs argues convincingly that women value children more than men do. He notes that 
if men valued children more than women did, men would pay women dearly to have them. 
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loss as a consequence of having children against the worth of chil-
dren to the woman and society. We would see to it that women get 
what most women want-time enough to nurture their children ad-
equately without being punished later by an unforgiving job market. 
Children make losers of women only because our society devalues 
childraising. 
Surely we can have no peace until we admit that children need 
us all, with our varied talents and skills, some probably gender 
based, some socially shaped, but all important. We can never 
reacknowledge this simple truth until we break free from radical 
feminism's repressive ideology that would deny us a free exchange 
of ideas. We must make up our own minds, live our lives in support 
of one another instead of at war, care for our children as we see fit, 
free from an ideological burden that impoverishes us all. We must 
learn to reconnect if our society is to survive. 
FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICE. By Bruce Allen Murphy.1 New York: 
William Morrow. 1988. Pp. 717. $25.00. 
John C Cha/berg2 
This is an overly long book about the public life of a Supreme 
Court Justice and his unplanned, undesired, and very brief judicial 
career. Justice Fortas served on the Court for a mere four years. 
Hounded by Lyndon Johnson to fill the vacancy created by the 
strange resignation of Arthur Goldberg, this "lawyer's lawyer's 
lawyer" reluctantly agreed to leave his lucrative Washington prac-
tice rather than disappoint his friend and client, the president. Har-
ried by congressional conservatives, Fortas reluctantly resigned 
from the Court in 1969 rather than face certain impeachment at the 
hands of his enemies in Congress. In between there was the aborted 
nomination of Fortas to Chief Justice in the waning months of the 
Johnson presidency. 
All this and more has been chronicled by Professor Bruce Al-
len Murphy, whose previous book was a study of the non-judicial, 
perhaps even injudicious, activities of Louis Brandeis and Felix 
Frankfurter. 
Like the work on Brandeis and Frankfurter, this is biography 
I. Professor of Political Science, Penn State University. 
2. Professor of History, Norrnandale Community College, Bloomington, Minnesota. 
